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Prepare and measure quantum key distribution protocols can be decomposed into two basic steps:
delivery of the signals over a quantum channel and distillation of a secret key from the signal and
measurement records by classical processing and public communication. Here we formalize the dis-
tillation process for a general protocol in a purely quantum-mechanical framework and demonstrate
that it can be viewed as creating an “effective” quantum channel between the legitimate users Alice
and Bob. The process of secret key generation can then be viewed as entanglement distribution us-
ing this channel, which enables application of entanglement-based security proofs to essentially any
prepare and measure protocol. To ensure secrecy of the key, Alice and Bob must be able to estimate
the channel noise from errors in the key, and we further show how symmetries of the distillation
process simplify this task. Applying this method, we prove the security of several key distribution
protocols based on equiangular spherical codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is currently the most
successful theoretical and practical application of quan-
tum information theory to solving a real-world problem
that classical information theory cannot: secure expan-
sion of previously held keys between two separated par-
ties using public channels. In its simplest form, it only
requires that one party, Alice, prepare and send individ-
ual quantum systems to the other, Bob, who immediately
measures them. No collective storage or manipulation of
the quantum systems is required, making it a very hum-
ble foray into the quantum world. After the quantum
communication phase is complete, Alice and Bob have
classical strings corresponding to the signal and mea-
surement records, respectively. With the aid of a public
classical channel and their previously held keys, they can
then collaborate to distill the new (longer) secret key
from these strings.
Ever more sophisticated methods of proving the uncon-
ditional security of such protocols have recently been de-
veloped. In particular, strong links have been forged be-
tween the security of a given protocol and the ability of a
suitable quantum version to implement entanglement dis-
tillation. Building on work by Lo and Chau [1], Shor and
Preskill [2] demonstrated that the classical distillation
steps of traditional prepare and measure schemes could
be seen as a version of entanglement distillation by using
Calderbank-Shor-Steane (CSS) quantum error-correcting
codes [3]. They illustrated this technique by application
to the prototypical Bennett-Brassard 1984 (BB84) pro-
tocol [4], and the analysis of the structurally similar six-
state protocol [5] followed soon thereafter [6]. By view-
ing the measurement as a local filtering operation [7], the
Bennett 1992 (B92) [8, 9] and “trine” Phoenix-Barnett-
Chefles 2000/Renes 2004 (PBC00/R04) [10, 11, 12] pro-
tocols were tackled by essentially orthogonalizing some
of the measurement outcomes in order to prepare them
for the CSS-based error correction.
The main obstacle to formulating such an uncondi-
tional security proof for general protocols is the concep-
tual difficulty of reconciling the framework of entangle-
ment distillation with the requirements proscribed by the
protocol. How to perform entanglement distillation is
clear enough; the trick here is to apply it to the cor-
rect quantum state such that the entire process properly
mimics the actual prepare and measure protocol.
Put differently, the problem lies in providing a quan-
tum description of the so-called “sifting” operation in
which the signal and measurement records collected dur-
ing the quantum communication phase are transformed
into a raw key. The name comes from the BB84 protocol,
where Alice and Bob keep only those signals and mea-
surements for which the associated bases used in prepa-
ration and measurement match, thus sifting the “good”
bits from the “bad.” The use of local filtering, as in the
analysis of the B92 and trine protocols, is one possible
quantum description of the sifting, or, more generally,
decoding, step. However, it implicitly assumes that the
distillation process requires only one-way communication
from Alice and Bob.
In this paper, we develop a general quantum-
mechanical formulation of the decoding step applicable
to a broad class of key distribution protocols. This im-
mediately leads to a general framework for unconditional
security based on entanglement distillation, which we il-
lustrate by proving the unconditional security of a sev-
eral equiangular spherical code protocols. Formalizing
the decoding step in this manner offers insight into the
mechanism underlying key distribution protocols. From
this vantage point we see that the decoding step performs
two critical tasks. First, the physical quantum chan-
nel and the decoding process merge into an “effective”
or logical quantum channel connecting Alice and Bob.
2This channel describes how the physical signal system is
transformed into a logical key system. Second, noise in
the physical quantum channel caused by an eavesdrop-
per, Eve, will be mapped to noise in the effective chan-
nel. Only the latter is relevant, as it is related to what
Eve might know about the key. Moreover, this noise can
be easily estimated from the error rate observed in the
decoded key string and can then be used to ensure the
security of the protocol.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.
Section II lays out the details of the prepare and measure
schemes under consideration. Section III then presents
a fully quantum-mechanical formulation of the decoding
phase. Using this, Sec. IV details how the decoding step
creates an effective quantum channel between Alice and
Bob within the postselected state space, with simplified
noise patterns relative to the actual physical channel.
The resulting formalism then enables us to easily treat
the question of security for more-complicated and higher-
dimensional protocols. Section V is specifically devoted
to the security of protocols using equiangular spherical
codes in two and three dimensions. Finally, Sec. VI con-
cludes with a discussion of further applications of this
work and open problems.
II. PREPARE AND MEASURE PROTOCOLS
In a generic prepare and measure quantum key distri-
bution protocol, two separated parties, Alice and Bob,
wish to make use of an insecure quantum channel and
a classical public broadcast channel in order to estab-
lish a shared, secret string. They already share a short
key with which they can authenticate messages from each
other sent on the classical channel. The goal is to expand
this short key into a longer version, suitable for encrypt-
ing a sizable amount of data. Roughly, their strategy is
to use the quantum channel to distribute quantum states,
which can then be translated into a (classical) raw key.
From this substrate the final key can be distilled with
the aid of communication over the classical channel. By
using quantum states, they will be able to quantify the
effect of Eve’s interference so that the appropriate coun-
termeasures may be taken during the distillation step—
e.g., privacy amplification. In the worst case, they can
abort the protocol if they find that Eve’s spying on the
channel is so severe that no secret key can be created.
These sorts of key distribution protocols can be de-
composed into two phases: a delivery phase using the
quantum channel and a distillation phase using the clas-
sical channel. Alice sends signals to Bob over the quan-
tum channel in the delivery phase, who immediately
measures them—hence the term “prepare and measure.”
The signals are drawn from the ensemble of signal let-
ters S = {|ξj〉 ∈ Cd}nj=1, where the prior probability for
each signal is encoded in its squared norm: pij = 〈ξj |ξj〉.
Bob’s measurement is described by a positive-operator-
valued measure (POVM)M = {|ηk〉 ∈ Cd}mk=1 such that
∑
k |ηk〉〈ηk| = 1. Without loss of generality both S andM are ensembles of pure states since ensembles of mixed
states could be further decomposed into them.
A signal ensemble is termed oblivious when∑
j |ξj〉〈ξj | = 1/d, meaning that a random signal
on the quantum channel is completely unbiased. In
contrast, general ensembles are biased, a property
Eve may be able to exploit. Here we will focus on
oblivious ensembles with uniform prior probabilities; the
obliviousness will play a small but important role in the
next section.
Given a noiseless quantum channel, the joint probabil-
ity for Alice to send the jth signal and Bob to obtain the
kth outcome is given by the simple rule
pjk = |〈ηk|ξj〉|2. (1)
Every round yields Alice and Bob one letter each; re-
peating the protocol generates strings which are samples
from this joint distribution. These strings are the output
of phase 1.
The task of phase 2 is to distill these strings into a
shared, secret key. This process can be represented by
a pair of functions, one each for Alice and Bob, which
map the signal and measurement strings to key strings.
An ordinary protocol will consist of several rounds of
mappings, and in each round the purpose of the classi-
cal communication is to coordinate the application of the
associated functions. The term “decoding” refers to the
initial rounds of the distillation process, specifically those
required to produce a secret key given a noiseless chan-
nel. Additional distillation steps are required for noisy
channels—namely, information reconciliation to correct
mismatched key letters and privacy amplification to en-
sure secrecy of the resulting key.
The set of distillation functions is quite large and the
choices of protocols myriad. For concreteness, we shall
focus on maps which attempt to distill one key letter
from each signal-measurement pair by use of one-to-one
functions. Note that the distillation procedure may, and
often does, fail for particular inputs. After presenting
and examining this formalism, we will describe how to
make generalizations for more complicated strategies.
Here it is convenient to describe the distillation func-
tions via their inverses. Suppose that each of Alice’s
and Bob’s maps results in a letter drawn from the set
{0, . . . , r−1}. Naturally, r ≤ min(n,m). The action of
one of Alice’s maps can be succinctly captured by the r-
tuple
(
σ(0), . . . , σ(r−1)), where σ(x) is the input signal
which led to the key letter x. For example, if Alice draws
signals from the set {a, b, c, d, e} and a decoding function
maps b to 0 and d to 1, the corresponding tuple is sim-
ply (b, d). The r-tuple thus records which inputs become
which key letters. Note that in this convention the dis-
tillation map is σ−1 and all inputs not appearing in the
r-tuple are discarded. By a slight abuse of notation we
denote this with the output symbol ; for instance, in
the previous example σ−1(a) = . Altogether, we shall
3assume that Alice has na (inverse) distillation functions
σs, while Bob has nb functions named τt.
The set T of allowable function pairs (s, t) fully de-
scribes each distillation step. Alice and Bob use the clas-
sical channel to coordinate their actions and determine if
the applied function pair yields a key letter—legitimate
function pairs may still fail to produce a key letter for a
given input. Again there are several options in how to
accomplish this in practice; here, we adopt a particular
communication scheme to perform allowable decodings
without making any claim to its generality. One of the
parties—say, Alice—initiates the procedure by randomly
choosing a function s compatible with her signal—i.e., a
function which does not map the signal to —and an-
nouncing this choice to Bob. He can then infer which of
his functions ensures that (s, t) ∈ T and then randomly
apply one of them.
The BB84 protocol provides the simplest example of
this framework. M and S both consist of (appropri-
ately normalized) linear polarization states, either hori-
zontal or vertical or inclined at ±45◦. Label these states
{—, |,upslope,}. Only those signals and measurements be-
longing to the same basis are to be kept, so the possible
sifting functions for both Alice and Bob are represented
by the tuples (—, |), (|,—), (upslope,), and (,upslope). The set
T just consists of the same function for each party. To
perform the decoding, Alice applies either of the two ap-
plicable functions to each signal and sends a record of
her action to Bob. This tells him which decoding func-
tion to use, and if applying it to his measurement result
does not produce the output , Bob keeps the output
and tells Alice.
Generalizations to more complicated schemes are now
straightforward. Keeping to single-letter decoding, whole
sets of signal or measurement letters can be mapped to
different key letters simply by considering r-tuples whose
entries are these sets. The modifications to the functions
for block decoding are self-evident: block inputs and
block outputs, keeping the reject output . To illustrate
the latter, consider a parity-check advantage distillation
step [13]. Alice computes the parity of a particular pair
of letters and transmits this to Bob. If this matches the
parity of his corresponding pair, they keep the first let-
ter; otherwise, they discard both. In the present frame-
work, this is described compactly by the decoding tuples
(00, 11) and (01, 10), where T consists of the same tuple
for each party.
As the distillation process is meant to create not only
a correlated, but also secret string, we must consider
the effect of announcing the distillation function publicly,
which could reveal information to Eve. Chosen properly,
however, the decoding will leave Eve completely nescient
of the key. Such is the case in the BB84 protocol, where
the sifting information tells Eve that the signal was one
of two possibilities, instead of the four originally possible.
Due to the structure of T , this information is completely
independent of the resulting key bit.
If the public communication leaks no information
about the key, then Eve’s probability for the key must
be uniform. As a sufficient (but not necessary) condi-
tion, we can require both that the signals be chosen with
uniform probability and that, in the multiset formed by
the union of all of Alice’s r-tuples, each signal appears
the same number na times. To cover the cases in which
the information flows from Bob to Alice, we will assume
that the measurement outcomes each appear the same
number nb times in his multiset. This includes essen-
tially every proposed key distribution protocol and, like
the choice of oblivious signal ensemble, will have some
advantages in the next section.
This limits Eve’s source of information about the key
to the quantum channel. The decoding process will turn
channel noise into key errors, and the number of errors
in the decoded key will be linked to the amount of in-
formation Eve could in principle obtain. By measuring
the error rate, Alice and Bob can tailor the remaining
distillation steps to suit their needs. For the prepare and
measure schemes under consideration here, we assume
that the further processing is independent of the specific
decoding details. That is to say, after making the de-
coded key, Alice and Bob forget which key letters were
the output of which decoding functions. As much is done
in the BB84 protocol, for example; basis information is
irrelevant after the sifting phase. This is not a trivial
step, since by retaining complete information, Alice and
Bob could possibly find that key letters from certain de-
codings require different handling than others. However,
it is not only vastly simpler to consider the average case,
but also affords considerable simplification of the channel
noise, as discussed in Sec. IV.
III. QUANTUM FORMULATION
We now give a fully quantum-mechanical description
for the prepare and measure protocol. In doing so,
we must retain the essential features of the protocol—
namely, the type of physical system actually sent and
the distribution of signals and measurements, given by
Eq. (1). Let Alice begin with the state
|Φ〉 =
√
d
∑
j
|ξ∗j 〉A|ξj〉B ∈ Hphys ⊗Hphys, (2)
where |ξ∗j 〉 is simply the complex conjugate of |ξj〉 in
the standard basis. The vector space to which |Φ〉 be-
longs is explicitly given as it will prove useful to keep
the various spaces clearly distinct. Here “phys” stands
for “physical,” denoting that this is the space which de-
scribes the actual physical signal sent. One may verify
that |Φ〉 is properly normalized by using the fact that
〈ξ∗j |ξ∗k〉 = 〈ξk|ξj〉.
Since the signal ensemble is oblivious, Alice can pre-
pare one of the signals |ξj〉 in subsystem B by measuring
her half with the POVM {d|ξ∗j 〉〈ξ∗j |}. Moreover, comput-
ing the expansion coefficients in the standard basis, we
4find 〈jk|Φ〉 = δjk/
√
d, meaning that |Φ〉 is the canonical
maximally entangled state in Cd ⊗ Cd.
After distributing subsystem B to Bob, they perform
the following operations to their respective systems:
P =
√
d
∑
j
|j〉〈ξ∗j |, M =
∑
k
|k〉〈ηk|, (3)
so that the state becomes
(P ⊗M)|Φ〉 =
∑
jk
|j〉A|k〉B〈ηk|ξj〉 ∈ Hprep⊗Hmeas. (4)
The partial isometries P : Hphys → Hprep and M :
Hphys → Hmeas realize the Neumark extensions of S and
M [14]. In other words, the POVM’s on Hphys are pro-
moted to projection measurements on Hprep and Hmeas,
all the while ensuring that the outcomes are still dis-
tributed according to Eq. (1).
Now for the crux of the whole enterprise. By promot-
ing the POVM elements to projection operators, each
party’s measurement can be easily restructured into two
parts: a coarse-grained and a fine-grained measurement.
The coarse measurement is a projection onto a subspace
spanned by many basis states, while the fine-grained
measurement then locates the precise basis state in the
subspace. The crucial point is that the outcome of the
coarse-grained measurement can be chosen to correspond
to the distillation function.
This is accomplished by employing the two operators
SA : Hprep → Ha ⊗Hkey and SB : Hmeas → Hb ⊗Hkey:
SA =
√
d
na
∑
sl
eiθ(s,l)|s〉|l〉〈σs(l)|,
SB =
1√
nb
∑
tm
eiφ(t,m)|t〉|m〉〈τt(m)|, (5)
which relabel theHprep andHmeas basis states in terms of
two registers for the coarse- and fine-grained steps. The
basis states of the vector spaces Ha and Hb label the
decoding functions, while the vector spaces Hkey contain
the decoded key. This is an equivalent representation
of the state as long as the operators are partial isome-
tries (with Hprep and Hmeas as their respective domains).
Thus, we must check that
∑
sl |σs(l)〉〈σs(l)| = nad 1 and∑
tm |τt(m)〉〈τt(m)| = nb1, which follows from the earlier
requirement that Alice’s (Bob’s) multiset contain each
signal (measurement) a fixed number of times.
Finally, the output states can generally acquire the
arbitrary phases indicated since they will not affect the
distribution of outcomes. The phases will be important
in the next section, however. The state now becomes
1√
nanb
∑
lm,st
|s, l〉A|t,m〉B
〈
η[τt(m)]
∣∣ξ[σs(l)]〉 ei[θ(s,l)+φ(t,m)],
(6)
where the first two systems are Alice’s and the latter two
Bob’s, and we have used the notation |ξ[j]〉 := |ξj〉 and
|η[k]〉 := |ηk〉. Within each pair, the first system refers to
the decoding function and the second to the key letter.
Now the decoding operation becomes trivial: simply
restrict the sums over s, t to only refer to proper function
pairs. For our chosen decoding scheme, Alice and Bob
need only exchange the results of standard basis mea-
surements on Ha or Hb in order to accomplish this task.
Averaging over all the valid function pairs is the final
step, since Alice and Bob do not condition any of their
subsequent actions on the particular decoding functions.
Performing this averaging procedure, one obtains the
bipartite key state ρ ∈ Hkey ⊗ Hkey = Cr ⊗ Cr. In the
standard basis, its components are given by
ρkeyij;kl =
1
nanb
∑
(s,t)∈T
∆s,tij;kl〈η[τt(j)]|ξ[σs(i)]〉〈ξ[σs(k)]|η[τt(l)]〉,
(7)
where ∆s,tij;kl = e
i[θ(s,i)−θ(s,k)]ei[φ(t,j)−φ(t,l)]. Altogether,
the decoding procedure defines a map fromHphys⊗Hphys
to Hkey ⊗ Hkey, whose nominal goal is to draw out the
correlated portions of the signal and measurement strings
and discard the rest by postselection. In quantum terms,
the decoding procedure increases the entanglement of the
state relative to its size by simply repackaging the avail-
able entanglement into a smaller system. (Recall that the
state Alice originally prepared was maximally entangled,
which changed when applying the P and M operations.)
When the resulting system is highly entangled, security
can be assured.
IV. EFFECTIVE CHANNELS
Now we turn to the operation of the protocol in the
presence of noise. In principle, we must assume that
all noise is due to Eve spying on the quantum channel.
Beyond the nominal goal of concentrating entanglement,
the decoding phase plays a pivotal role in the protocol
by creating an effective channel between Alice and Bob
whose parameters they can easily estimate. Knowledge
of these parameters then allows them run the classicized
CSS procedure to distill the final key.
Essentially, the averaging procedure induced by dis-
regarding which key letters came from which decoding
functions does all the work. For the moment, let us sup-
pose that Eve tampers with each signal individually, per-
forming some joint unitary operation on the signal and
any number of ancillary systems she may care to use. For
a completely general security proof we must also consider
the case in which she attacks blocks of signals, which we
return to at the end of this section. The change to the
signal system itself can be described by the superopera-
tor E = ∑pEp ⊙ E†p. Here the Ep are Kraus operators
or operation elements [14]. Following this channel action
5with the decoding map SAP ⊗ SBM yields
ρkeyij;kl =
1
nanb
∑
p,(s,t)∈T
∆s,tij;kl〈η[τt(j)]|Ep|ξ[σs(i)]〉
×〈ξ[σs(k)]|E†p|η[τt(l)]〉. (8)
[Remember that Eq. (7) describes the key in the absence
of channel noise.]
The symmetries of the set T will now help to reduce
the form of E . Consider the automorphism groups G for
S and H for M, consisting of unitary operators Ug and
Vh which map the respective sets onto themselves, up to a
global phase factor for each state. This phase factor may
depend on the pair of distillation functions σs and τt as
well. Formally, we have Ug|ξj〉 = eiα(g,s,j)|ξg(j)〉 for some
(real-valued) function α, where g(j) is used to denote the
permutation action of G on S. Similarly for the measure-
ment states, Vh|ηk〉 = eiβ(h,t,k)|ηh(k)〉 for some function
β. These operators can be applied to the r-tuple speci-
fying the destillation function σs, resulting in the action
(|σs(0)〉, . . . , |σs(r−1)〉) Ug−→ (Ug|σs(0)〉, . . . , Ug|σs(r−1)〉).
(9)
Similarly, one obtains an action on the r-tuples of τt using
Vh.
The symmetry group we are after is the subgroup of
G×H which preserves the set T : unitary operators which
map pairs of r-tuples in T to other pairs in T .[22] Call
this group Aut(T )∗; it is a subgroup of the full automor-
phism group of T . In the BB84 protocol, for instance,
the r-tuples can be transformed into one another by a
45◦ rotation:
(|,—) → (upslope,)
↑ ↓
(,upslope) ← (—, |).
(10)
Additionally, the ordering in each pair can be separately
reversed by suitable reflections. Altogether this produces
a symmetry group with eight elements.
Using Aut(T )∗ allows us to shift the sum over T in
Eq. (8) to a sum over the group elements, replacing each
particular (s, t) by
(
g(x), h(y)
)
for some fiducial pair
(x, y). If the group Aut(T )∗ is transitive, then the en-
tire sum can be rewritten in this manner. In case the
orbit visits pairs multiple times, which is equivalent to
the existence of a stabilizer subgroup of Aut(T ) acting
trivially on the fiducial pair, several copies of the sum
are generated which can be fixed by renormalizing. On
the other hand, if the group is not transitive, then many
fiducial pairs will be required so that their orbits com-
pletely cover T .
We are interested in the representation of Aut(T )∗ by
operators of the form Ug⊗Vh, which is is generally projec-
tive since phase factors make no difference to the quan-
tum state. For the same reason, the decoding functions
are also susceptible to rephasing. To keep matters un-
der control, we can put the latter phases to work against
the former by setting θ(s, j) = α(g, x, j) for s = g(x) and
φ(t, k) = β(h, y, k) for t = h(y). In the case that Aut(T )∗
is transitive, the simplified density matrix elements are
ρkeyij;kl =
∆x,yij;kl
nanb
∑
p,(g,h)∈Aut(T )∗
〈η[τy(j)]|V †hEpUg|ξ[σx(i)]〉
×〈ξ[σx(k)]|U †gE†pVh|η[τy(l)]〉. (11)
Thus, the symmetry of the decoding map induces an ef-
fective channel between Alice and Bob, described by the
symmetrized superoperator
Esym =
∑
p,(g,h)∈Aut(T )∗
V †hEpUg ⊙ U †gE†pVh. (12)
This symmetry reduces Eve’s possible interference with
the effective channel. To determine the possible forms of
Esym, first express it as the output of a symmetrization
super-superoperator R:
Esym =
∑
(g,h)
(V †h ⊙ Vh) ◦ E ◦ (Ug ⊙ U †g ) = R[E ]. (13)
Appendix A details a method of using tensor products to
represent superoperators by means of the isomorphism
A ⊙ B → BT ⊗ A, which we can use to represent Eve’s
effective action as
Esym ≃
∑
p,(g,h)
V Th E
∗
pU
∗
g ⊗ V †hEpUg
=
∑
(g,h)
(V ∗h ⊗ Vh)†
(∑
p
E∗p ⊗ Ep
)
(U∗g ⊗ Ug)
=
∑
(g,h)
(V ∗h ⊗ Vh)†E(U∗g ⊗ Ug). (14)
This reduces the symmetrization action to a superop-
erator itself, and we can iterate the process to write it
directly as R ≃ ∑(g,h)(U †g ⊗ UTg ) ⊗ (V Th ⊗ V †h ). R is
Hermitian, which follows from the fact that the terms in
the sum are group elements and each element is paired
with its conjugate, avoiding difficulty with the projec-
tive representation. Group composition implies that R
is idempotent, up to a constant of proportionality. Thus
all possible effective channel superoperators belong to the
trivial eigenspace: R[Esym] = Esym, a drastic reduction in
the possible forms of Eve’s tampering.
The expression for the bipartite key state can be fur-
ther simplified using the # operation also defined in Ap-
pendix A. Letting SxA =
∑
k e
iθ(x,k)|k〉〈ξ∗[σx(k)]| (note
the conjugated state) and SyB =
∑
k e
iφ(y,k)|k〉〈η[τy(k)]|,
direct calculation leads to the simple expression
ρkeyAB = (S
x
A⊗SyB)(I ⊗Esym[|Φ〉AB〈Φ|])(SxA⊗SyB)†, (15)
where, again, the state |Φ〉 from Eq. (2) is maximally en-
tangled. Instead of averaging over the different decoding
6possibilities, now only the “fiducial” decoding is applied,
but to the output of a suitably averaged channel. The
end result of this analysis is to identify and delineate the
two tasks performed by the decoding: The fiducial decod-
ing operators SxA and S
y
B characterize the entanglement-
enhancing abilities, while the effective channel operator
Esym encapsulates the noise simplifications.
In case Aut(T )∗ is not transitive, we need only make a
small modification to the above procedure. The set T is
partitioned into disjoint orbits, and instead of choosing
one fiducial decoding (x, y), we will need one from each
orbit in order to cover all of T . The final key state then
contains contributions from every orbit. For the security
analysis, we relax the condition that Alice and Bob throw
away information regarding which decoding was used and
instead treat these terms separately. Each orbit then
gives rise to an effective channel superoperator, and we
will take the worst case.
This concludes the fully quantum-mechanical formula-
tion of the decoding portion of the protocol. The further
steps of information reconciliation and privacy amplifica-
tion can be given a quantum formulation as a CSS-based
entanglement distillation procedure [15, 16], which is ap-
plied to the output of the effective channel. Distillation
of maximally entangled states then assures the privacy of
the key. Given the channel parameters, the rate bounds
of the CSS codes (along with the probability of successful
decoding) determine the key generation rate of the QKD
protocol. The CSS codes bring their own symmetries to
the procedure as well, digitizing the effective channel into
a Pauli channel.
The relevant noise probabilities of the effective channel
are given by overlaps with the various generalized Bell
states:
bjk = 〈βjk|ρkey|βjk〉. (16)
For qubit-based keys, the states |βjk〉 are the four Bell
states; in general, they are the complete set of maximally
entangled states generated by the action of generalized
Pauli operators XjZk on half the canonical maximally
entangled state. Unfortunately, Alice and Bob do not
have independent access to all these noise probabilities.
Instead, they can only obtain an estimate of the error
probability of the decoded keys by directly comparing
some small fraction of them. This probability ε is the
sum of contributions from all generalized Pauli operators
which are not purely of Z-type—i.e.,
ε =
d−1∑
j=0
d−1∑
k=1
bjk. (17)
The goal is to determine the bjk as functions of the error
rate ε or, failing that, at least find upper bounds. Then,
given the Pauli channel, bounds on the rate of random
hashing can be used to infer the secure error-rate thresh-
old of the key distribution protocol [17].
The preceding applies when Eve performs a collective
attack, interacting with signals independently and iden-
tically. However, to establish unconditional security of
the protocol, we must consider the most general attack,
called a coherent attack, in which Eve coherently ma-
nipulates all of the signals. By a slight modification of
the protocol we may ensure that if the protocol is secure
against collective attacks, then it is also secure against
coherent attacks.
The modification requires Alice and Bob to randomly
reorder their signal and measurement data. This ensures
that the error rate found by sampling some of the re-
sulting key bits is representative of the error rate in the
unsampled key. This gives them direct estimates of some
of the noise probabilities, and for those which are not
directly sampled, Azuma’s inquality ensures that if a re-
lation such as bjk < fjk(ε) holds for every key letter, then
the frequencies observed in a long sequence also obey this
constraint [12, 18]. Since the efficacy of random hashing
depends on these frequencies, arbitrary correlations be-
tween signals pose no additional difficulties [16].
One loose end remains to be tied up. In the simpli-
fied expression for the key, Eq. (15), some phase freedom
remains in the operators Sx and Sy. These phases can
make a difference in the secure error threshold of the pro-
tocol even though they have no influence on the distribu-
tion of signal and measurement data. Though seemingly
improper at first glance, this effect is due to an inherent
flexibility Alice and Bob have in constructing the CSS-
based entanglement purification scheme. In canonical
form, the CSS code is built from eigenspaces of products
of the operators X =
∑
j |j+1〉〈j| and Z =
∑
k ω
k|k〉〈k|,
where ω = e2pii/d. However, Alice and Bob only ever ac-
tually measure in the standard Z basis, meaning they
are free to alter the X operator in any manner consistent
with the stabilizer formalism. In particular, they can
equally well substitute X˜ =
∑
j e
iψj |j+1〉〈j| for X with-
out changing the crucial relationship ZX˜ = ωX˜Z. The
altered Pauli operators give rise to a rephased variant of
the maximally entangled states,
|β˜jk〉 = 1⊗X˜jZk|Φ〉 = 1√
d
∑
l
ωl exp
[
i
j−1∑
m=0
ψl+m
]
|l〉|l+j〉.
(18)
For instance, in the case of two two-level systems, the
general set of maximally entangled states reads |00〉 ±
|11〉, eiψ0 |01〉 ± eiψ1 |10〉. Thus, altering the phases ap-
pearing in Sx and Sy can indeed change the distribution
of noise bjk without affecting the distribution of signals
and measurements pjk.
V. SECURITY OF SPHERICAL CODE QKD
PROTOCOLS IN SMALL DIMENSION
The preceding gives a general method for establishing
the unconditional security of protocols exhibiting a high
degree of symmetry. One needs (merely) to find the rel-
evant automorphism groups and then straightforwardly
compute the bjk distribution to determine the secure er-
7ror threshold for any given protocol. To demonstrate this
technique, we turn our attention to quantum key distri-
bution protocols employing equiangular spherical code
signal states in low dimensions.
A. Qubit tetrahedron
In the tetrahedral protocol of [11], Alice’s signal qubits
are given by four states whose Bloch vectors form a regu-
lar tetrahedron. Bob’s measurement states correspond to
the inverse (in the sense of the Bloch sphere) of this tetra-
hedron, so that each of his outcomes rules out one poten-
tial signal. Alice decodes two of the states into a logical
bit and announces which ones to Bob. If his measurement
rules out one of the possibilities, he can determine the
bit; the whole procedure succeeds with probability one-
third in the absence of noise. Alice’s decoding functions
are equivalent to ordered pairs of signal states, of which
there are 12. Since Bob’s successful decoding function
is completely specified by Alice’s, 12 possible decoding
combinations exist in total and only one-way communi-
cation from Alice to Bob is required. The automorphism
group corresponds to A4, the alternating group on four
elements, and can be projectively represented on C2 for
both parties using the following two generators:
σx =
(
0 1
1 0
)
,
1√
2
(
1 −i
1 i
)
. (19)
This group representation corresponds to using the tetra-
hedron generated from the fiducial state (
√
3 +
√
3|0〉+√
3−√3eipi/4|1〉)/√6 for the signals.
From the automorphism group it is easy to calculate
the trivial eigenspace of R, which is in this case spanned
by only two superoperators. By appropriate use of the #
operation, the output of the channel for maximally en-
tangled input can be expressed as a linear combination of
the identity operator and the maximally entangled state
again—i.e., the depolarizing channel. Next, a fiducial de-
coding consisting of restriction to the fiducial signal state
and its image under the first A4 generator σx can be ap-
plied and the error probabilities of the resulting state
can be tabulated. In terms of the depolarization rate
p, they are given by b01 = b11 = 2b10 = p/(2 + p) and
b00 = 1 − b01 − b10 − b11, where all phases appearing in
the fiducial decoding operators were set to zero. Finally,
we can apply the random hashing bound on the number
of distillable maximally entangled states S(ρ) from an
input state ρ with diagonal entries in the Bell basis given
by bjk: S(ρ) ≥ 1 − H({bjk}), where H is the Shannon
entropy. From this one obtains a threshold depolariza-
tion rate of approximately 16.69%, corresponding to an
error rate ε = 3p/(4 + 2p) of approximately 11.56%.
B. Qutrit spherical code protocols
For qutrits—three-level quantum systems—there are
four possible equiangular spherical code signal ensembles
Alice could choose from, with n =4, 6, 7, and 9 elements,
respectively. A myriad of protocols exist using these as
signals, but here we confine our attention to those for
which Bob’s measurement outcomes are orthogonal to
two signal states and the goal of the decoding step is to
establish one bit. The latter requirement means that the
decoding functions have support on only two signals at a
time, or in other words, Alice informs Bob that the signal
sent is one of only two possibilities. The set T consists of
function pairs corresponding to the cases in which Bob’s
measurement outcome and Alice’s announcement allow
him to determine which signal she sent. Since the raw key
alphabet consists of just two letters, Alice and Bob can
make use of qubit CSS codes to perform error-correction
and privacy amplification.
The technique of having Bob’s measurement repudi-
ate some of Alice’s signals was introduced briefly in [19].
Letting Πj = |ξj〉〈ξj |, we can formulate the measurement
as
|ηj,k〉〈ηj,k| ∝ 1− Πj +Πk − {Πj ,Πk}
1− Tr[ΠjΠk] . (20)
Since for spherical codes the denominator does not de-
pend on j and k, the set of projectors can easily be found
to sum to the identity operator.
For each protocol we attempt to find Aut(T )∗ and from
this extract the possible outputs of the corresponding ef-
fective channel for each orbit in T ; Aut(T )∗ is nontran-
sitive for all these protocols. Then the phases of the
canonical decoding operators must be judiciously chosen
to find the best secure error threshold. In the first three
protocols n = 4, 6, 7 it is necessary to give up on ran-
dom hashing directly and retreat to finding a CSS code
which can correct the bit and phase errors independently,
for there are too many parameters to determine the rela-
tionships between the various Pauli errors exactly. This
strategy was also used in the security analysis of the trine
protocol [12]. When n = 9 the effective channel is again
a depolarizing channel and therefore the better technique
of random hashing can be used.
Table I shows the threshold error rates and sufficient
threshold fidelities for these protocols, whose details are
laid out in Appendix B. One might expect a trend to
higher tolerable error rates and minimal fidelities with in-
creasing number of signals, but the seven-element spher-
ical code breaks rank, requiring the cleanest channel. A
quick check of the appendix reveals the reason: there
are 1050 possible decoding combinations, but the largest
known automorphism group has only 42 elements, yield-
ing 25 distinct orbits. Thus, a fairly large mismatch ex-
ists between the symmetry of the decoding combinations
and those realized by action on the signals, which sim-
ply does not restrict the channel as much as in the other
8Spherical code protocol Threshold error rate Sufficient threshold fidelity
[4,2,2,1] 11.56% 0.917
[4,3,2,2] 8.90% 0.881
[6,3,2,2] 11.00% 0.844
[7,3,2,2] 10.37% 0.916
[9,3,2,2] 11.80% 0.843
TABLE I: Threshold error rates and fidelities for the qubit tetrahedron protocol and the four spherical-code-based key distri-
bution protocols in three dimensions. The protocols are named according to the convention [n, d, k,m] where n is the number
of signals, d is the dimension of the associated vector space, k is the number of possible remaining signals after Alice announces
the decoding information (i.e.,k is the size of the key alphabet), and m is the number of signals which are ruled out by Bob’s
measurement. The threshold error rate is the maximum secure error rate of the key, while the sufficient threshold fidelity is a
upper bound on the corresponding fidelity of the output state of the symmetrized channel with the maximally entangled input.
Fidelities beyond this limit are sufficient for key creation.
cases. However, it should be noted that the full automor-
phism group might be larger.
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
By treating the decoding step of prepare and mea-
sure protocols quantum mechanically, we have presented
a general formalization which enables the application of
the entanglement-distillation proof technique to a broad
class of key distribution protocols. Additionally, we gain
insight into the general role decoding plays in quantum
key distribution. On the one hand, the symmetries of the
signal and measurement states are found to play a clear
and direct role in security proofs. Applying this machin-
ery to the symmetries of various equiangular spherical
codes in two and three dimensions yielded the secure er-
ror threshold for the associated protocols. On the other
hand, treating the decoding step in more detail reveals
the mechanism by which Alice and Bob are able to esti-
mate the various noise parameters: The decoding step
creates an “effective” quantum channel between Alice
and Bob, whose noise properties they can more easily es-
timate than those of the physical channel. The decoding
creates a sort of logical communication layer embedded
within the physical layer of actual signals. With this for-
mulation in place, we can now begin to consider more
complicated decoding strategies: two-way communica-
tion, block-wise and set-wise decoding, as well as more
general “imperfect” protocols whose decoding schemes
which produce nonmaximally entangled states.
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APPENDIX A: SUPEROPERATOR
REPRESENTATIONS
In expressing superoperators, one convention is to
use “⊙” as a placeholder for the input operator—i.e.,
(A ⊙ C)[B] = ABC. However, this makes representa-
tions cumbersome. Instead one would like to express the
superoperator as a matrix and the input operator as a
vector. This is easily done, albeit in two distinct ways.
First, note that we can flatten the operator B into a vec-
tor by applying it to half of a maximally entangled state,
like so: B → (1 ⊗ B)|Φ〉. This action is called the VEC
map. The action of (A ⊙ C) on B then becomes multi-
plication of VEC(B) by the operator CT ⊗ A. Another
matrix representation of superoperators can be obtained
by applying the superoperator to half of a maximally en-
tangled state. This furnishes a representation similar to
the way VEC produces a vector from an operator, so
the map is termed OP. Here one finds immediately that(I ⊗ (A ⊙ C)[Φ])
ij;kl
= ajickl, which is related to the
CT ⊗ A representation by simply interchanging the first
and last indices i and l. This “partial transposition” can
be denoted by #, as in
[OP(A⊙ C)]ij;kl =
[
(CT ⊗A)#]
ij;kl
. (A1)
A more detailed account of this superoperator sleight of
hand can be found in [20].
APPENDIX B: QUTRIT SECURITY DETAILS
In this appendix we list the ingredients which are re-
quired to complete the security proof for the qutrit spher-
ical code protocols, including the signal states, the auto-
morphism group, and the phases of the decoding opera-
tors.
91. [4,3,2,2]
Beginning with the vector 1√
3
(|0〉 + |1〉 + |2〉), four
equiangular states labeled 0, 1, 2, 3 can be generated from
it by application of the operators 1 0 00 0 −1
0 −1 0
 ,
 0 0 −10 1 0
−1 0 0
 ,
 0 −1 0−1 0 0
0 0 1
 ,
(B1)
in this order. These operators also generate the auto-
morphism group, which is a representation of S4. Take
the fiducial decoding (0, 1) for Alice and ({1, 2}, {0, 3})
for Bob, where the two sets identify the states ruled out
by his measurement. Then Alice’s phases can both be
set to zero, while Bob must choose them to have a dif-
ference of pi. From this it follows that ephase ≤ 32ebit,
which then leads to 8.90% by the CSS rate bound
1 − h2(ebit) − h2(ephase). Here h2 is the binary Shan-
non entropy. This also holds when we consider three
other decodings for Bob: ({1, 3}, {0, 2}), ({1, 2}, {0, 2}),
({1, 3}, {0, 3}). Under the group action these four fiducial
decodings cover all of the 48 possibilities.
2. [6,3,2,2]
First let φ be the golden ratio (1+
√
5)/2. Then start-
ing with (
√
φ|1〉+√φ−1|2〉)/51/4, six equiangular vectors
are generated by the group formed from the first two of
the following: 0 0 11 0 0
0 1 0
 ,
 1 0 00 1 0
0 0 −1
 , 1
2
 φ 1− φ 11− φ 1 φ
1 φ 1− φ
 .
(B2)
Adding the final operator gives the full automorphism
group, which is a projective representation of A5. One
can then derive that ephase ≤ ebit.
3. [7,3,2,2]
Letting η = exp[2pii/7], the seven-element spherical
code in three dimensions can be generated by repeated
application of the first of the operators η 0 00 η2 0
0 0 η4
 ,
 0 1 00 0 1
1 0 0
 (B3)
to the vector 1√
3
(|0〉 + |1〉 + |2〉). The second stabilizes
the starting vector, along with the antiunitary operation
of complex conjugation in the standard basis. Altogether
this yields a group of order 42, using which one derives
that ephase <
9
8ebit.
4. [9,3,2,2]
Let ω = e2pii/3. Forming the nine element group from
the first two of the generators 0 0 11 0 0
0 1 0
 ,
 1 0 00 ω 0
0 0 ω2
 ,
 1 0 00 ω2 0
0 0 ω2
 , 1√
3
 1 ω2 ω21 1 ω
1 ω 1
 , (B4)
and applying them to the fiducial vector (|1〉 − |2〉)/√2
generates the SICPOVM. The latter two generators sta-
bilize the fiducial vector and enlarge the automorphism
group to consist of 216 elements which are isomorphic
to the Shephard-Todd reflection group number 25 mod-
ulo its center [21]. This group gives rise to a depolar-
izing effective channel, and the various errors are found
to obey the relations b1,0 = 2b0,1(6 −
√
3)/15 and b1,1 =
2b0,1(6 +
√
3)/15.
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